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In this brief surveyI have omitted whole topic areas-dance therapy,kinesiology, and festivals,among others-and repeatedlyswervedtoward the West
because of my own training and bent. I hope nonetheless to have disclosed
some sense of the IED's broad geographicalcoverage,as well as the adventurousness of its editors,the high caliberof its contributors,the freshnessof its research, the eclecticism of its disciplinaryapproaches,and the efficiency and
sometimes downright excellence of its writing. For despite the IED's imperfections, quirks,and occasionallacunae,it standsas a great achievementwhose
editors have accomplishedthe feat, as the first edition of the New Grovedid
twenty years ago, of commissioning essays (some of which will stand as classics) from scholarsand writersat the top of their professions,and publishing
an encyclopedia that immediately established itself as indispensable. (And
more so than the 1980 Grove,it must be noted, the IED reachedboth across
disciplinaryboundariesand into the realmof the practitionerwhen recruiting
its contributors.)The IED is now by farthe most comprehensiveand rigorous
dance referencesource available-one that also closes many longstandinggaps
in dance scholarshipand sets a new standardfor it. It has solved the problem
noted some time ago by Agnes deMille, who lamentedthe lackof an inclusive
referencework on dance thus: "Nothing is comprehensive,nothing catholic,
nothing sweeping, and this we must have" (l:xxx). Now we do, and this is
good news for all of us.
MARIANSMITH

A Theoryof Art, by KarolBerger.New York:Oxford UniversityPress,2000.
xiv,287 pp.
In A TheoryofArt, KarolBergerundertakessomething that many readerswill
think is no longer possible:a theory of art in the grand, traditionalstyle, that
is, a philosophicalspecificationof the natureof art in general,comprehending
variousworks in variousmedia in varioushistoricalperiods.This philosophical
specificationis also intended to yield an account of the value of art-as though
works as diverse as Bart6k's quartets, Whitman's poems, Jean Renoir's The
River,and the novels of Dickens all have some common value. Berger'sambition is both breathtakingand welcome. If we are not able to say something
general about art and its value, then we are in danger of reducing the values
of artworksto one or another form of exteriorinstrumentality:political,economic, cognitive, religious,or tribal,as may be the case.
Berger begins in chapters1 and 2 by consideringthe media of art and the
uses of works of art. He suggests that most philosophyof art is mistakenlypreoccupied with the identificationof worksof art. In contrast,he says,"I am trying to shift the focus of aestheticsto the question, What should the function of
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art be, if art is to have a value for us?"(p. viii). Here Bergeris mistakenthat a
great shift in the philosophy of art is called for. Aristotle, Kant, Hegel,
Heidegger, Collingwood, and Dewey among others, all defined art in terms
of its function and offered rich accounts of the value of art in and for life. It is
only philosophers with essentiallyempiricistcommitments (such as Hume)
who focus on identificationat the expense of function and value. But Berger's
value-orientedstance is correct. Given the spectacularmaterialdiversityof art
objects, if we are to define art (other than indexically),the definitionwill have
to be cast in functionaland value-ladenterms. As Bergerputs it, "In a pragmatic spirit, I take the question, What is x? to be equivalentto, What is the
function of x? Or, What is x for?We know what something is when we know
what can be, should be, or is being done with it" (p. 3). As Saul Kripkeand
Hilary Putnam have argued, this is not true for definitions of natural-kind
terms such asgold or tiger.But it is compelling for artifactual-kindterms such
as art.
So what can we do, shouldwe do, or do we do with art-with works of art
in general?Is there any plausibleand useful answerthat can be given to this
question? Berger argues that art is a worthwhile pursuit (and artworkshave
a distinct nature) if and only if (1) art has an indispensableculturalfunction,
(2) that function is fillfillableby it alone (so that art has no externalpurposes),
and (3) that function is fulfilledby much existing art (so that our theory will
not be a mere philosopher's abstraction,out of touch with what is actually
made and caredabout as art) (p. 11).
What, then, is the indispensableculturalfunction that the things we centrally care about as art uniquely fulfill? In specifying the function of art,
Aristotle,Kant,Hegel, and others all helped themselvesin partto a generalaccount of the functions of things. For Aristotle, nature is the result of, and is
useful for, divine intelligence contemplatingitself in and through its embodiment in things;human rationalnatureis a privilegedsite of this work of divine
intelligence, since it alone is capableof rationallyinvestigatingthe rest of nature; and artisticimitationsare generatedas part of rationalhumanity'sreflection on its own situation,functions, and limitations.Kant offers a similar,but
sparserand more franklyconjectural,teleology of human reasonin relationto
nature.Hegel and Heidegger, in reactionto Kant,offer something once again
thicker.But none of these accounts of the functions of nature, of rationalhumanity,or of art is likely,on its own, to prove persuasive.They seem too conjecturaland too likely to privilegeone form of artisticpracticein the face of
art's legitimate varieties (as in Heidegger's casting of Greek temples and
Hol61derlin's
hymns as nearlythe only genuine works of art). Human beings
have, it seems, multiple interestsratherthan any single defining function, and
works of art seem to come in differentshapesso as to answerto those diverse
human interests.So how, now, plausibly,can we talkabout thefunction of art?
Berger'sresponseto this question is to reflectsimultaneouslyon a considerable range of past works in various media and on how a function definitive
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of art might better or best be fulfilled now. To adopt this method is selfconsciouslyto make the philosophy of art less abstract,to bring it into closer
alignmentwith criticism.The philosophyof artwill hence have simultaneously
a representationalist-realistdimension (describing much of what has been
most plausiblyregarded as art) and a critical-utopiandimension (evaluating
the past and pointing to what art might be in the future). The philosophy of
art must be both an account and an argument, both attentiveto the past and
normativefor the future. In simultaneouslyrepresentingartisticpracticeand
recommendingwaysof continuing it, the philosophyof artwill itself be an ongoing practiceof responsivecriticalreflection,not a completablequasi-science.
All this is, in my own view, exactlyright. It is an indispensablestance if we are
to think and talk reasonablyabout functions and values at all. (This picture
of the philosophy of art does, however, undermine Berger'sway elsewhereof
distinguishingphilosophy as argument about possibilitiesfrom art as fictional
representation,from history as representationof actuality,and from science as
argument about actuality[p. 58]. Contra Berger, philosophy as both representation and critical argument runs through and across these other three
practices.)
Berger'sguiding articulationof the function that artworksfulfill,which he
elicits from his criticalreflectionson past works and on the media of art, then
runs like this:the media of culture,and art among them, allow
us to begin to find out what we should want and what we should avoid, to

makechoicesbetweenvariousobjectsof ourdesireandbetweencompetingor
conflictingdesires,to justifyourdesiresandensuingactionsto ourselvesandto
others,to justifyour feelings.Ultimately,the mediaallowus to deliberateon
the question,How shouldwe live?,to chooseto the extentthatit is possible
ouractionsandpassionsandto justifyourchoices.(p. 66)
Put thus abstractly,this conception of art'sfunction fallssquarelyin the tradition of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Collingwood, and Dewey; it has considerable
persuasivepower. Everything turns, however, on exactly how this picture is
furtherfilled in, in particularon what conception of deliberationand choice is
developed.
In developing his account of choice, Berger initially begins with instrumentalist-soundinglanguage.Art is able "to evoke imaginaryworlds" (p. 62),
and by doing so it can "spellout... the actualand likelyconsequencesof [a]
form of life" (p. 67), so that we might see whether it is desirable.But desirable
in what sense?Here Bergerattemptsto balancea theory of the good (as what
it is correct to desire) againsta more pluralistand naturalisttheory of desires
(as wants that are simply given). His account of deliberationabout the desirable is mostly developed by sorting through various traditional theories.
Conscienceis best at telling us what not to do; it is not so good at articulating
what is affirmativelydesirable(pp. 70-71). Kant'saccount of practicalreason
is similarlyempty of substantivenormativecontent (p. 71). In contrastHegel
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usefullyteachesus that "our duty is to engage in the perfectingof some of the
practicesof our society and to take care of the institutions that make these
practicespossible" (p. 72). Herder helps us to see how to be both faithfulto
our own traditionsand open-minded (p. 73). Aristotle helps us to see how
representations"teachus to feel aright"(p. 78): to pity the pitiable,to fearthe
fearftil,to admirethe admirable,and to desirethe genuinelydesirable.
For Berger,no univocal account of choice and its proper objects emerges
from this survey of philosophicaltheories of deliberation.There will be ongoing argumentwithin and between cultures about what is desirable.In responding to these arguments,judgmentwill be necessary,as Gadamerreminds
us (p. 86). Takingpleasurein artworksand their originalyet intelligibleorderings of their materialspreparesus to love freedom as an intelligiblyordered
and humanly expressiveway of life, as Kant and Schillersuggest (p. 102). In
sum, and deliberatelyechoing Hegel, Bergermaintainsthat art is "capableof
giving sensuous embodiment and representationto our most profound needs
and concerns"(p. 243).
Bergerfurtherdescribeshow worksin variousmedia fufill their function of
embodying and representingprofound needs and concerns. He definesworks
of art as "physicalobjects produced in the process of encoding an experience
in a medium" (p. 18). The relevantexperienceis the experienceof a presented
world. "A work requires being interpreted as a world" (p. 24): it presents
something. What a work presents,however,may be something quite abstract.
For example,following RichardWollheimand KendallWalton,' Bergerholds
that as soon as we see one color area behindanother,we are seeing something
presented:intentional objects with spatialrelationsdiscernedthrough imaginative "seeing-in," not mere blobs of color. As a result, the distinction between representationaland abstractworks of art does not really hold. All
works of art present something. Sculpturecan representspace (and ways of
apprehendingit imaginatively),even when otherwise abstract,as well as simply occupying it. Paintingcan representlight. Most important,music too, including absolute music, is representationalor presents a world, even if in a
weak sense. It does not normallydepict specificobjects or events. In a linear
ordering of media running from those that emphasizethe mode of presentation to those that emphasizethe matteror specificobjects presented,absolute
music ranksat the farend of emphasison mode. It lacksspecificpresentedobjects and offers only a "plot of moods" (p. 210) or an "abstractplot devoid of
any subject or object" (p. 212). But-as Roger Scruton argues at length in
TheAestheticsof Music2-we hear tones,not mere sounds, as intentional objects that lead to one another.As Bergerputs it, "The tonal and metrichearing
1. Wollheim, Painting as an Art (Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress, 1987), 46, 62; and
Walton, Mimesisas Make-Believe:On the Foundationsof the RepresentationalArts (Cambridge:
HarvardUniversityPress, 1990), 55-56.
2. Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1997; see esp. chap. 2, "Tone,"pp. 19-79.
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of pitches and beats, the fact that we hear some of them as wanting to move,
or as being pulled, toward others, means that what we hear in real sounds is
something imaginary"(p. 31), that is, relationsof departingfrom and leading
to that are essentiallydiscernedthrough the imaginative"hearingin" of what
is there to be heard.
Againstthe backgroundof his accounts of the function and media of art in
chapters1 and 2, Bergeroffers-in a centralchapter3 that will be of the greatest interest to readersof this journal-"The Genealogy of Modern European
Art Music." Self-consciousart music, intended for active and repeated hearing, comes on the scene only when notation systemsfor fixing a work in writing are available.The "abstractlogic of tonal relations"(p. 133) then becomes
a possiblefocus of attentionfor its own sake,ratherthan something subsumed
to the needs of religiousritualor the immediategratificationsof popularsong.
Bergersees the subsequent evolution of Europeanart music as dominated
by the pursuit of two contrastingways of developing the logic of tonal relations. From roughly 1350 to 1550, the chief aim was the embodiment of
continuous consonance; the ars perfectaof musical Pythagoreanismwith its
consonant polyphony was dominant. From roughly 1550 to 1650, a second
aim of representingthe passionsof individualscame slowly to displaceor jostle
the first aim. Beginning chiefly with Monteverdi, composers sought to "expressand impress... the passionsof the words" (p. 124) of the texts they set.
BergerreadsRameau's1722 Traitede l'harmonieas a reversionto the musical
Pythagoreanism of Zarlino's 1558 Le istitutioni harmonice. In contrast,
Rousseau's emphasis (against Rameau) on melody and the imitation of the
passions in his Essai sur Porigine des langues is viewed as a continuation of
Galileo'sprogressivemusicalhumanismin his 1581 Dialogo della musicaantica, et della moderna.This interestinglyand plausiblyreversesthe usual account of the Rousseau-Rameaudebate. The underlying causes of the shift
away from musical Pythagoreanismand toward mimetic individualismare
complex. They include-at least-the rise of modem physics (with its undermining of belief in a harmoniouslyordered cosmos), the rediscoveryof ancient humanist texts in the late fifteenth century, and the general increasein
possibilitiesof the developmentof individualitythat modernityinaugurates.
With the advent of "Classical"style from roughly 1780 to 1820, purely
instrumentalmusic-as Schopenhauer,Hanslick, Dahlhaus, and others have
argued-becomes centrallyimportantas a way of "givingexpressionto an essentialmetaphysicalregion inaccessibleto language" (p. 135). This later shift
returnsto the idea that music has metaphysicalsignificance,but its significance
is now to presentthe vicissitudesof an inexhaustiblelonging within, not a harmonious cosmos without. With increasingsecularizationand changes in the
patronagesystem, artistsof all kinds come to feel that their work-expressing
their aspirationsfor deep social reciprocityor communion-is both significant
and yet lacks any ready audience. "By presenting instrumentaldiscoursesof
considerablesize, discoursesthe internalcoherence and sense of which were
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based on the harmonicand motivic logic of tonal relations,matureViennese
symphoniesand string quartetsdemanded to be taken seriouslyas objects of
aesthetic contemplation" (p. 138). Throughout the nineteenth century, this
achievement of Viennese "Classical"style music fracturesinto a "competition" (p. 139) between the frankmimeticismof programmusic and the avantgardismof abstractabsolute music, and the hold of art music on its audiences
becomes less secure.
Avant-gardistanti-mimeticismcomes to dominance in the earlytwentieth
century.Schoenberg and his successorsat Darmstadtattempted to work out
significantpatternsof purelymusicalgesture that would resistboth the insinuating but trivialcharmsof an increasinglybroadentertainmentcultureand the
political engineering of culture by the likes of Stalin and Zhdanov. But their
gestures of resistancebecome increasinglyformal and empty. As they depart
furtherfrom mimesis,they face a threatof sheeremptinessand unreceivability,
leading Bergerto askwhether the "threatof meaninglessness"that attendsabstractart music'sseparationfrom all mimeticismcan be overcome (p. 149).
Here Berger suggests that we might hope for "some form of rapprochement and accommodation between the abstractand mimetic ideas, a refertilization of abstractionwith mimesis"(p. 150). We can alreadysense something
of this in musicology in Anthony Newcomb's work on "archetypalplots" of
purelyabstractworks (p. 150)3 and in musicalworksthat indulge in anthropomorphicgestures,figurativetitles, allusionsand quotations, and invocationsof
practicalor social functions of music such as dance. Among contemporary
composerswho strikehim as usefullyworking to bring abstractionand mimesis together in music, Bergerlists Ligeti, Penderecki,Carter,Lutoslawski,and
Berio.
Thesetrendsinspirehopethatthe canonof artmusichasnot beenclosedwith
the generationof the 1880s. The perspectivesof new musicseem brighter
todaythanat anypoint in the lastfiftyyears,as the hungerfor artcarryinga
reasserts
itselfandasthe mid-century
ColdWarconditions
spiritual
significance
becomea faintmemory.... Whatbecomesincreasingly
morelikely... is that
the best compositiontodaywill attractmore than the professionals
and the
canonwill expandagain,becausethe most ambitiousandtalentedcomposers
willno longersee anyneedto continuethe self-mutilating
banon mimesisand
tonality,no longerfeel thatthey mustspeakan artificialEsperantoor not be
heardat all.(p. 151)
3. See Newcomb's "NarrativeArchetypes and Mahler's Ninth Symphony," in Music and
Text:Critical Inquiries,ed. Steven Paul Scher (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1992);
and "Action and Agency in Mahler's Ninth Symphony, Second Movement," in Music and
Meaning, ed. JeneferRobinson (Ithaca: Comell UniversityPress, 1997). I might also mention
the work of Fred Everett Maus and KendallWalton. See especiallyMaus, "Music as Drama,"
Music TheorySpectrum10 (1988): 56-73; and Walton, "Listeningwith Imagination:Is Music
Representational?"TheJournalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism52 (1994): 47-61, both reprinted
in Robinson, ed., Musicand Meaning.
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One might quarrelwith a number of featuresof A Theoryof Art. It is not
clear that Berger'shope for a satisfyingfuture musicalpractice,within which
abstractionand mimesis come together, is more plausible than Leonard B.
Meyer's 1994 prediction of increasingformalism,style pluralism,and emptiness in music.4 Berger provides only sketchy remarksabout contemporary
composers and no real analysisof any of their works. It is regrettablethat he
paysno attention to the composerswho might well be seen as having successfully struggled to blend abstractionwith mimesis from roughly the 1930s to
the 1970s: say,Copland, Bart6k, and especiallyShostakovich.Berger'slist of
composersof presentinterestseems eclectic and ill-considered.Why not John
Adams or George Rochberg or William Schumann, each of whom might
seem to illustrateBerger'sclaims better than the more abstract,less mimetic
Berio or Carter?Berger'smetaphysicsof tone and hearingis not as fiullydeveloped as the similartheory in Scruton. Nor is his account of artisticrepresentation in various media as detailed as that of Kendall Walton, on whom he
draws. His account of authentic moral deliberationis somewhat sketchy and
not alwaysargumentativewhere it needs to be. Set against these difficulties,
however, is Berger'sconsiderableaccomplishmentin masteringand integrating enormouslydifficultand diversematerialsfrom history,philosophy,social
theory, and musicology,and doing so with enormous learning,elan, and even
courage. This accomplishmentsets an agenda to be worked through further,
as readerswill unavoidablyfind themselves considering and responding to
lines of thought about art and its value-and also about music's particular
possibilitiesof achievement-that Bergerhas broached.
RICHARD ELDRIDGE

4. Meyer, "Postlude-Future Tense: Music, Ideology, and Culture," in his Music, the Arts,
and Ideas:Patternsand Predictionsin Twentieth-CenturyCulture (Chicago: The Universityof
Chicago Press, 1994), 317-49.
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